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EU budget above continuous political disagreement. We suggest the creation of
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should be allowed to borrow on capital markets to anticipate pre-allocated EU
expenditure, such as Structural and Cohesion Funds. Markets would thus be a
factor in EU budget policymaking, with a potentially disciplining effect. Atta-
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delivered in this way is a form of assistance.
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THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE 2013 EUROPEAN
UNION BUDGET came to a stalemate after member
states failed to reach an agreement on the
disbursement of unpaid bills for 2012.
Negotiations on the EU budget for 2014-20 also
risk collapse. In both cases the problem is a
disagreement between the net contributors and
the net recipients about  the absolute size of the
budget. While tensions over the size of the budget
have a long history, this time is different because
EU leaders have too often and too forcefully
advocated the use of the EU budget for growth to
be able to drop the idea without incurring political
and institutional costs for the EU as a whole.
The Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF, 2014-
20) negotiations should be finalised by December
2012 to allow time for the legislative phase from
January to May 2013. Failure to reach an agreement
on the 2014-20 budget implies, among the various
costs, a delay in the preparation of the strategic
plans each member state puts together to explain
how it intends to use Structural and Cohesion Funds.
This Policy Contribution reviews the discussion
about the size of the EU budget. we suggest that
the discussion is plagued by ideological differ-
ences and by the failure of EU leaders to discuss
what type of growth they want, when they use
Structural and Cohesion Funds for investment. The
battle over size is one with no future and is
unlikely to solve fundamental ambiguities about
the role of the EU budget. EU leaders should
instead prioritise a more flexible EU budget, that
is safeguarded from future political power strug-
gles, with reinforced impact assessment of EU-
funded growth policies and conditionality. To at
least partly address these priorities, we suggest
the creation of a flexible European Growth Fund
that would allow the European Commission to
borrow on capital markets to advance the dis-
bursement of EU money typically used to finance
investment (ie Structural and Cohesion  Funds).
THE SIZE OF THE EU BUDGET FOR 2014-2020
The 2014-20 MFF negotiations revolve chiefly
around  the size of the EU budget. Three broad
camps can be identified. The Friends of Better
Spending coalition includes Austria, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and
Sweden, and argues for the explicit use of the
budget for growth and competitiveness and a size
that should not exceed 1 percent of EU GNI. The
Friends of Cohesion coalition groups together
Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Spain and is
generally supportive of the European
Commission’s MFF proposal. In a more isolated
position, the United Kingdom is arguing for
significant downsizing of the budget and is
threatening to exercise its veto power.
The European Commission proposed a budget for
2014-20 worth roughly €1033 billion in
commitment appropriations (1.08 percent of EU
gross national income). Including off-budget
items, the proposal reaches a figure of €1093
billion (1.14 percent of  EU GNI)1. The
Commission’s proposal is rather conservative and
implies, in real terms, a small cut in the size of the
budget down to 1.08 percent from the 1.12
percent of EU GNI of the current 2007-2013 MFF.
Capping the budget at 1 percent of EU GNI implies
a cut of €75 billion from the formal Commission
proposal, but a much larger cut of €135 billion
when accounting for all off-budget items. On 29
October 2012, the Cypriot EU Presidency tabled a
draft proposal that drops close to €60 billion from
the Commission proposal (after discounting for
the reclassification of some budget items)2.
Another proposal, from European Council
President Herman Van Rompuy, goes for a deeper
cut in the order of about €81 billion from the
comprehensive Commission draft budget3.
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Differences in the proposals do not justify risking
the suspension of EU spending in 2014 when the
MFF is due to start. But the size of the EU budget is
charged with political symbolism. Over-focusing
on its size diverts attention from more important
issues and some missed opportunities. First, EU
leaders have been advocating the use of EU funds
to spur growth and employment during the crisis;
at the same time they have failed to agree on what
kind of economic growth they wanted. Second, the
fight about expenditure ceilings is predicated on
the assumption that EU funds are ineffective or
unable to generate added value, which has yet to
be shown convincingly. Third, and linked to the
previous issue, the EU has failed to deliver a rigor-
ous impact assessment of EU cohesion policy, an
exercise that should precede any discussion
about budget size. Fourth, the obsession with size
signals a fundamental disbelief in the effective-
ness of the conditionality that will be attached to
the disbursement of cohesion spending.
There is another reason why failure to reach a deal
on the long-term EU budget, and the recent break-
down of the negotiations for the 2013 budget, are
self-inflicted political and institutional costs for the
EU as a whole. The deadlock undermines the so-
called ‘Compact for Growth and Jobs’, which was
designed to show the EU's commitment to sup-
porting economic growth in the face of criticism
about the excessive focus on austerity. Agreed at
the European Council of 28-29 June 2012, the
Growth Compact4 was a political commitment to
quickly spend about €120 billion from unused
Structural and Cohesion Funds, and from Euro-
pean Investment Bank (EIB) loans, especially in
crisis countries5. Agreement by EU leaders to
encourage faster absorption, swiftly followed by
refusal to pay into the EU budget to allow the
actual disbursement of EU funds marks the death
of the Growth Compact and possibly of future pan-
European initiatives for growth.
While during the crisis the EU was concerned that
some member states seemed unable to absorb
available EU funds, attention has now shifted to
the supply side. The use of EU funds for growth,
especially growth in the countries that do not have
national resources to finance investment, cannot
succeed unless a mechanism is put in place that
allows for their rapid disbursement. In addition,
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4. See http://www.consil-
ium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_
sdata/docs/pressdata/en/ec
/131388.pdf.
5. European Council
(2012c).
6. The evidence on the
growth effects of EU cohe-
sion policy is mixed, see
Marzinotto (2012); Santos
(2008).
the disbursement of funds should be conditional
on the presence of an appropriate institutional
framework (eg respect of EU single market
directives). Finally, once the funds have been
disbursed, assessment of their impact should be
rigorous and the withdrawal of funds could
become possible if they have been used
inappropriately (eg it is clear that they are not
used for investment but rather for consumption).
WHAT TYPE OF GROWTH?
Tensions over the size (and the composition) of
the long-term EU budget are a constituent part of
any MFF negotiation. Some negotiators assume
implicitly that the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP), which is to a great extent just a form of
income support to the benefit of producers,
represents a dead weight the EU has to carry from
one period to the other because of strong political
lobbying by some member states and
considerable institutional inertia. This is too
simplistic. First, the CAP has not been stable. The
share of the EU budget devoted to supporting
farmers has progressively decreased while
spending on competitiveness and cohesion has
grown (see Figure 1). Second, not all agree on the
desirable objective of Structural and Cohesion
Funds, which are supposed to be, whether rightly
or wrongly, the most productive expenditures of
the EU budget6. And yet, while the EU has long
advocated the use of the EU budget for growth, it
has failed to agree on what type of growth.
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Figure 1: CAP versus Structural and Cohesion
Funds as % of total EU budget expenditures
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission (2009,
2012b).
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When EU leaders claim that EU funds are an
instrument for growth, they may be talking about
at least five different objectives; these may all be
achieved at once, but some of them may also be
inconsistent with one another:
• Stimulate demand during recession; this is
more or less what is intended when EU leaders
invoke the application of unused Structural and
Cohesion funds during the crisis;
• Improve a country’s growth potential through
capital expenditure, but also by spending on
technology and skills; this is not necessarily at
odds with the idea that investment is mostly
needed in periods of crisis: prolonged periods
of recession impact on the growth potential of
a country by forcing a significant reduction of
productive investment;
• Create the conditions for growth in countries
that would otherwise not grow;
• Achieve growth in the most efficient manner,
which would imply investing in areas from
which the return on investment is highest;
• Generate European added value by investing in
projects with cross-border benefits, the costs of
which must be borne by parties proportionally.
Failure to discuss what type of growth the EU
needs and to recognise that some of the objec-
tives may be inconsistent7 (eg generating either
efficient growth or European value added may be
counter to the solidarity objective of generating
growth where it is most needed) probably con-
tributes to the ambiguity of the different national
positions on the role of the EU budget8.
7. An early discussion of
potential inconsistencies is
in Boldrin and Canova
(2001).
8. An interesting proposal to
combine the need to gener-
ate European value added
and accommodate national
preferences is provided by
Santos and Neheider
(2009).
BEYOND ABSORPTION
During the crisis the attention of EU leaders was
focused on the slow absorption of Structural and
Cohesion Funds (ie the slow pace at which they
were using pre-allocated EU funds). The reasons
for slow absorption typically vary, ranging from
the difficulty of pulling together national funding
to match EU grants, to poor management
capacities and lack of viable projects. At the end
of 2011, few EU countries had a record of well
above-average absorption of EU funds (Estonia,
Ireland, Lithuania and to a lesser extent Germany)
(Figure 2). However, there are numerous EU
instruments that have been conceived for the
purpose of fostering absorption in the individual
member states (see Box 1). 
Whilst absorption may become a problem after EU
funds have been pre-allocated, we are now in a sit-
uation in which the real problem is one of supply
of funds, because net contributors are resistant to
contribute to the EU budget. This is evident at the
beginning of each MFF but tensions can also
emerge over the annual EU budget, as the failed
negotiations for the 2013 budget suggest. Whilst
an agreement on the 2014-20 MFF must be found
in the shortest possible time, the delivery of the
EU budget could benefit from some reframing to
prevent annual deals being blocked: the use of
these funds for fostering economic growth, an
objective on which all parties seem to agree,
requires in fact a much greater degree of flexibility
than there is at present. 
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Figure 2: Percentage of used EU funds as of end 2011
Source: Bruegel based on data from DG REGIO
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Supply side constraints
The idea of employing unused Structural and
Cohesion Funds to finance investment projects
gained traction during the crisis. However, it is not
feasible to mobilise them all in a short period, as
any money given to EU beneficiaries consists of
outflows from net contributors and hence an out-
right government liability. They need to be dis-
bursed gradually until the end of each MFF, which
in spending terms closes two years after the offi-
cial end of the MFF. Based on the numbers for the
2007-13 MFF, gradual disbursement implies that a
maximum annual amount of about €50 billion
may be transferred in cash to the beneficiaries of
EU funds. Anything above this figure would not be
BOX 1: AVAILABLE TOOLS TO BOOST EU FUNDS’ ABSORPTION
The slow and inefficient absorption of Structural and Cohesion Funds is not new. Over the years and
in particular under the Financial Perspective 2007-13, the EU has devised various instruments to
facilitate absorption in the member states. Some provide mainly economic support; others technical
and to some extent political support, especially in countries under financial assistance.
a. Economic support
• Commission pre-financing: the EU provides a pre-financing sum before each project’s completion
that amounts to 5 to 7.5 percent for ‘old’ member states and 7 to 10.5 percent for ‘new’ member
states, depending on the type of project.
• Co-financing rate: the EU contribution to total project costs vary depending on the objective for
which the funds have been allocated, whether for convergence or competitiveness, and on the
category of recipient countries, whether ‘old core’ or peripheral countries. As a result, the size of
the contribution from the EU can vary from a minimum of 50 percent to a maximum of 85 percent.
In the crisis, the maximum co-financing rate has been increased to 95 percent to facilitate absorp-
tion and tackle the main problem of the unavailability of national resources to match EU Funds.
• JEREMIE (Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium Enterprises): allows the use of pre-allo-
cated EU funds as venture capital, loans or guarantee funds to support the activities of small and
medium enterprises (SMEs). It is a form of pre-financing, as the money is channelled to member
states before the completion of the project, whilst allowing managing authorities to gather the
resources in holding funds that can be managed by the European Investment Fund (EIF).
• JESSICA (Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas): assists member states
in devising alternative financing instruments to invest in underdeveloped urban areas.
b. Technical and political support
• Technical assistance: some EU funds are explicitly earmarked for technical assistance for an
amount equal to 0.25 percent of each fund’s annual provision. When the initiative is taken at the
member state level, technical assistance may represent between 4 and 6 percent of the total costs
of each Operational Programme, depending on the type of project.
• JASMINE (Joint Action to Support Micro-finance Institutions in Europe): mainly provides technical
assistance to micro-credit providers (eg assessment or credit rating).
• JASPERS (Joint Assistance to Support Projects in European Regions): provides technical assis-
tance to new member states in collaboration with the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); technical assistance is given free of
charge following a member state’s request, and is mainly directed to the preparation of large infra-
structure projects. 
• Taskforce: a Taskforce for Greece was created in the summer of 2011 with the purpose of offering
support on the ground to managing authorities in the selection of the most worthy projects within
existing Operational Programmes.
• Conditionality: a formal commitment to accelerate the absorption of Structural and Cohesion Funds
is included in the macroeconomic adjustment programme of two of the euro-area countries cur-
rently under financial assistance (ie Greece and Portugal).
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doable and face the opposition of the countries
that are net contributors to the EU budget, namely
Germany, the UK, France, Italy, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Austria, Denmark and Finland9.
The supply-side problem has been recognised.
This explains the effort to devise alternative finan-
cial engineering instruments that may be used to
leverage a yearly sum greater than the €50 billion
potentially available. The EIB has been identified
as the ideal candidate to help expand capital
supply. Three proposals have been put forward
and approved by EU leaders. First, the capital base
of the EIB has been increased by €10 billion to
allow more capital to be raised on markets, and
hence an expanded supply of loans to finance
large infrastructure projects. Second, it has been
suggested that EIB loans could be used to match
Structural and Cohesion Funds, thus providing co-
financing, which EU member states are unable to
provide at times of severe budgetary con-
straints10. Third, the EU has launched a project
bonds initiative11. Project bonds are issued by pri-
vate entities for investing in large (revenue-gen-
erating) infrastructure projects. The role of the EU
and the EIB is only to provide credit enhancement
to private issuers, under the condition that the pro-
posed projects satisfy criteria set ex ante by the
European Commission.
However, there has been no proposal to use the
EU budget itself for the purpose of enhancing the
supply of capital or, size aside, to make delivery
of already agreed commitments more automatic.
One obvious constraint that explains this timid
approach is that the EU Treaty prohibits deficit
spending, namely borrowing by the EU to finance
ordinary budgetary expenses. However, a closer
look at the commitments of the EU budget would
suggest some degree of exposure anyway.
The EU as a borrower
The EU budget covers directly the risks associated
with any financial assistance provided either to
non-euro area countries through Medium-Term
Financial Assistance (MTFA) or to euro-area
countries through the now expired European
Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM).
Moreover, it covers indirectly risks associated with
other forms of support.
9. The problems of unpaid
bills for 2012, which led to a
collapse in the negotiations
on the 2013 budget, show
that the process may
become very political
almost independently of
the size of due payments.
10. See also Marzinotto
(2011).
11. See
http://ec.europa.eu/econ-
omy_finance/financial_oper-
ations/investment/europe_2
020/index_en.htm.
12. Regulation No
407/2010 of May 2010
establishing a European
financial stabilisation
mechanism explicitly states
that “the outstanding
amount of loans or credit
lines to be granted to
Member States... shall be
limited to the margin
available under the own
resources ceiling for
payment appropriations”.
13. EIB loans to third coun-
tries represent 98 percent of
the current exposure.
The EFSM with a lending capacity of €60 billion
was created in May 2010 to respond to the crisis,
whilst the MTFA with a maximum lending capacity
of €50 billion  already existed. Under both
programmes, the European Commission borrows
money on capital markets under implicit EU
budget guarantee, but only up to a total amount
that should not be above the EU budget’s own
resources margin (ie the difference between own
resources and payment appropriations)12. The
rationale for imposing this threshold is to protect
the EU budget from the possibility that financial
resources granted to vulnerable EU countries are
not recouped.
The EU budget has also commitments, the risks of
which it covers indirectly. These commitments
consist of financial assistance to third countries
provided under three instruments for a total
amount that may not exceed €30 billion: Macro-
Financial Assistance (MFA), Euratom loans and EIB
loans to third countries. The current total exposure
is €18 billion, of which EIB loans represent the
largest and almost exclusive component13. In this
case, the risk is not directly covered by the EU
budget but by the ‘Guarantee Fund for External
Actions’, the value of which should never be lower
than 9 percent of the total outstanding debt. The
Fund consists of direct payments from the EU
budget and the provisioning amount is calculated
and transferred a year after the loans have been
granted.
A FLEXIBLE EUROPEAN GROWTH FUND 
To overcome constraints on the supply of funds,
create a commitment device and isolate the EU
budget policymaking, we propose the creation of
a European Growth Fund (EGF) within the long-
term EU budget that would allow large amounts of
outstanding Structural and Cohesion Funds to be
transferred without delays to support economic
recovery in the most vulnerable countries. The
European Commission is already contracting
borrowing on capital markets or with financial
institutions under implicit EU budget guarantees
to provide assistance to highly indebted countries.
Our suggestion is that a similar model is applied
to provide resources to finance growth-enhancing
initiatives for an amount that should not exceed
the size of the unused Structural and Cohesion
7BR U EGE L
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Funds. One obvious constraint is that the EU may
not opt for deficit spending to finance ordinary
budgetary expenditures, and cohesion spending
is one such ordinary expense. And yet, crisis
times may justify labelling growth spending as an
extraordinary expenditure just like the financial
assistance to high-spread countries.
How to apply? What financing structure? What
safety nets?
Member states should be able to apply for the EGF
in the same way that they do for financial
assistance. Assistance will be granted by the
Council’s qualified majority. Each member state
(or managing authority) may apply for funding to
invest in projects with medium- to long-term
impact up to a sum that cannot exceed the size of
the country’s unallocated Structural and Cohesion
Funds. Contextually, the member state (or
managing authority) can apply for technical
support to the preparation of the project, whether
it is a large infrastructure project of over €50
million or a smaller project, for example improved
access to finance for SMEs14.
The European Commission would decide, on a
case-by-case basis, to reduce the national co-
financing rate by at least 10 percent15. The actual
saving in national resources would amount to just
5 percent as the remainder is used to make
interest payments on the fresh capital received to
fund a project. The EU loan to each member state
would be short-to medium-term debt with a
maturity varying from one to nine  years until two
years after the formal end of the MFF. The capital
would be paid back in instalments as the cash
becomes available each year following approval
of the annual EU budget until the end of the MFF
plus two years.
To reduce the exposure to risk, a guarantee fund
could be created based on the example of the
‘Guarantee Fund for External Actions’. Net contrib-
utors would thus transfer only the amount that is
necessary for building up the new Guarantee
Fund. The provisioning amount for the Guarantee
Fund would be calculated and transferred with the
next year’s EU budget. The size of the Guarantee
Fund should not impose any excessive (yearly)
burden on net contributors (see Figure 3).
14. EIB loans to third coun-
tries represent 98 percent
of the current exposure.
15.  Technical assistance
may be provided under the
already existing instru-
ments. See Box 1.
The greatest advantage from such a plan is that it
eliminates the political constraints that are at the
basis of the current discussion about the 2013 EU
budget. There would be less of an incentive for
using annual EU budget negotiations for political
objectives, as the markets are a convincing
creditor.
Comparison with similar instruments
The EGF would have a governance structure
similar to a financial assistance package. The
destination of use, however, would be comparable
to project bonds. However, it would differ from both
in important respects. For example, while financial
assistance may become a permanent transfer
from strong to weak member states if the latter are
unable to repay, the EGF would be the advance
payment of an already-agreed solidarity transfer
from rich to poor regions, provided the money is
really used for investment to contribute to the
catching up of poor regions and to impede the
formation of poverty traps. Moreover, while project
bonds are issued by private entities and the EU
provides just credit enhancement, the EGF would
consist of bonds issued by the European
Commission under implicit EU budget guarantee.
Seen in comparative perspective, the EGF would
have a number of advantages: 
• Member states would apply for the fund not
only when there is a national growth problem,
but even a problem limited to just one region,
to which the central government is unable to
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respond in the short-term. 
• The EGF would be an instrument for investment
in emergency times, while project bonds are an
instrument for good times. Under uncertainty,
risk aversion should rise and it may be difficult
to pool together a critical mass of private bond
issuers.
• Project bonds have been conceived to finance
only few large transnational infrastructure
projects, raising doubts about the EU’s capacity
to realise proper portofolio diversification. The
EGF could be used to finance any type and size
of project.
• Credit enhancement to private issuers is
granted provided the proposed project satisfies
a number of criteria set ex ante by the
European Commission. Setting criteria a priori
is problematic in itself because a project’s
feasibility and cost-efficiency are likely to clash
with the objective of financing investment
where this is most needed. The EGF would be a
tool to allow disbursement of EU funds, the
initial allocation of which was done bearing in
mind the wealth of regions relative to the EU
average.
• The cash provisioned in the Guarantee Fund
would be liquidated to the assisted member
states at the end of the MFF. This alleviates the
problem of excessive concentration of
payments into the EU budget in the last years
of the MFF.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The EU budget could be an important source of
economic growth. The rapid use of funds in
periods of crisis is an essential condition for
success. Various tools are already available that
can support the absorption of unused EU funds,
ranging from the possibility to bargain a higher EU
co-financing rate to pre-financing through
JEREMIE and various forms of technical
assistance (Box 1). But there is also a problem on
the supply side, with net contributors to the EU
budget refusing to commit to EU expenditures.
Failure to reach an agreement will translate into a
delayed absorption of funds in the 2014-20 MFF.
But it will also nullify all efforts to present the EU
as an agent for growth, marking the death of the
Growth Compact.
The priority is to make the EU budget more flexible,
protect it from political blackmail, while reinforcing
monitoring of EU-funded projects and their impact.
The EU with the support of member states should
collect the necessary impact assessment data
and should consider withdrawing funds when EU
money is not used in an appropriate fashion. This
is a more worthy battle for net contributors than
the battle about size. 
To improve flexibility each member state should
be able to apply for an early disbursement of EU
funds. Our European Growth Fund would be a
revamped Growth Compact providing for a
mechanism to avoid delays in disbursement,
whist locking net contributors into a relationship
with markets. The positive side is that all EU
countries can benefit from it, euro-area and non-
euro area countries, and that, in conditions of
uncertainty, it would be a more realistic method
than project bonds for the financing of long-term
projects. It would be not a perfect, but a functional
method to at least meet most of the ‘possible
growth objectives’ we have listed. EU money is
used to finance investment projects that improve
a country’s growth potential, yet this may have
substantial demand effects if there is a large
investment upfront. At the same time, this is only
a different method to deliver the money and does
not alter the allocation method of EU cohesion
spending, which is based on the idea that
countries with a lower-than-average GDP per
capita need to receive proportionally more than
others; in this respect it remains a solidarity
instrument (ie a development policy). By contrast,
as EU member states continue to consider the EU
budget ‘national money’, whether this is paid in or
paid out, and until the EU does not have own
resources, projects that generate European value
added and whose benefits are likely to be diffuse
shall better be financed through EIB loans16.
The revamped Growth Compact would also
improve the perception that some EU member
states may have of the institutional and
macroeconomic conditionality attached to the
disbursement of EU funds. The ‘assistance model’
behind the EGF in fact implies that beneficiaries
accept conditionality ex ante, which would make
the European Commission’s intervention
legitimate.
16. On the need to exploit
synergies between Struc-
tural and Cohesion Funds
and EIB loans, see
Marzinotto (2011).
17. European Council
(2012b). 
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The EGF could co-exist with the idea recently
floated by European Council President Van
Rompuy of a risk-sharing mechanism for the euro
area17. Our European Growth Fund is a budget for
the effective allocation and redistribution of
resources in Europe; it is a way of increasing the
flexibility of permanent transfers from rich to poor
regions, provided they are really used for
productive investments. The risk-sharing
mechanism would be stabilising when the euro
area is hit by asymmetric shocks resulting in only
temporary transfers from unaffected to crisis-hit
countries. Not only could the EGF and the risk-
sharing mechanism co-exist, but they might even
be complementary in the case of euro-area
countries. Crises are typically associated with a
drop not just in actual growth but also in the
growth potential of a country through the
investment channel. When a crisis hits, the euro-
area budget may prevent too dramatic a drop in
actual growth, whilst immediate EU-financed
investment would  prevent a country from falling
onto to a different, lower-growth path. 
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